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THE UNCERTAIN SCOPE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN
WASHINGTON AFTER SAVAGE V. STATE
Kristi Anderson Bjornerud
Abstract: In a recent decision, Savage v. State, the Washington Supreme Court declined to
extend a parole officer's personal qualified immunity to the State where the plaintiff alleged
negligent supervision of a parolee. This Note examines the effects of the Savage decision on
the scope of sovereign immunity in Washington. It argues that the court has needlessly
confused the boundaries of sovereign immunity, and should act either to abolish all judicially
created limits on state liability, or create a clear test to determine under what circumstances an
underlying immunity will be extended to a government employer sued on a respondeat
superior theory of liability.
The Washington Supreme Court, in Savage v. State,' recently refused
to extend the personal qualified immunity enjoyed by parole officers to
the state where the State had been sued on a respondeat superior theory
of liability.2 Briefly, the facts of the case were as follows: Martin
Schandel raped Margaret Savage in July 1985. At the time of the rape,
Schandel had been on parole for three months for an underlying
conviction of second degree assault while armed with a deadly weapon?
Schandel was convicted of the rape. Savage sued the Washington State
Department of Corrections. She alleged negligent supervision of a
parolee, both directly and on a respondeat superior theory of liability.4
Savage did not sue the parole officers assigned to supervise the parolee.'
The trial court refused to instruct the jury on whether the parole
officers enjoyed immunity and on the extension of that immunity to the
1. 127 Wash. 2d 434, 899 P.2d 1270 (1995).
2. Id. at 447, 899 P.2d at 1277.
3. Schandel had prior convictions for rape. Savage v. State, 72 Wash. App. 483, 486 n.1, 864 P.2d
1009, 1011 n.1 (1994), a'd inpart and rev'd inpart, 127 Wash. 2d 434, 899 P.2d 1270 (1995).
4. Savage, 127 Wash. 2d at 438 n.2, 899 P.2d at 1272 n.2. This Note assumes that Savage sued
the State for its independent negligent acts in supervising its parole officers and on a respondeat
superior basis for the negligent acts of its parole officers in supervising the parolee. This assumption
is based on the fact that the State can supervise a parolee only through its parole officers and
therefore can be liable for that supervision only vicariously. Additionally, the larger entity known as
"the state" is responsible for the statutes, rules, and regulations that parole officers must follow while
supervising parolees. Therefore, any negligence associated with making sure that parole officers are
complying with those statutes, rules, and regulations can only be attributed to the State
independently. Whether vicarious liability should be applied to the State at all, given that the State
only can act through its employees, is beyond the scope of this Note. 0
5. Id.
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State.6 The jury returned a verdict for Savage.7 The jury verdict did not
indicate to what extent the State was held liable on a respondeat superior
theory and to what extent it was held liable for its own acts.' The trial
court denied the State's motions for a new trial and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and entered judgment on the verdict for
Savage in the amount of $204,752.'
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury that the State could only be held liable
for the actions of its parole officers if those actions were not protected by
the officer's personal qualified immunity was prejudicial error.'0
However, the court of appeals held that the trial court correctly denied
the State's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it
found that there was enough evidence of the State's own independent
negligent acts to sustain a verdict against it on that ground." The court
remanded for a new trial.'2 On review, the Washington Supreme Court
reversed and reinstated the trial court's judgment, holding that a parole
officer's personal qualified immunity should not be extended to the
State. 13
The Savage case is significant because it departed from a long line of
precedent in Washington State that extended various underlying
employee immunities to the state employer where the policy supporting
the underlying immunity also supported the extension of that immunity.
In departing from established precedent in order to achieve the result in
Savage, the supreme court undermined the foundation of sovereign
immunity and blurred the boundaries of what was already a confusing
body of law. In addition, Savage may be read as overturning several
cases that had previously protected the state and other government
entities from tort liability under specific circumstances. Finally, the court
6. Id. at 491-92, 864 P.2d at 1014.
7. Savage v. State, No. 86-2-15724-7, 1992 WL 609131, at *1 (Wash. Super. Ci. Feb. 10, 1992).
The jury found Savage 20% contributorily negligent. It appears that the plainti Ff convinced her
attacker to leave her home before the rape occurred. However, the plaintiff subsequently neglected to
lock her doors, allowing the attacker to gain entrance when he returned later the ;;ame night. This
may be the basis of the jury finding of contributory negligence. The jury deliberated for three and
one half days before returning a verdict in the amount of $204,752.
8. Savage, 127 Wash. 2d at 438, 899 P.2d at 1272.
9. Savage, No. 86-2-15724-7, 1992 WL 609131, at *1.
10. Savage v. State, 72 Wash. App. 483, 492, 864 P.2d 1009, 1014 (1994), ai'd in part and rev'd
inpart, 127 Wash. 2d 434, 899 P.2d 1270 (1995).
11. Id at 493, 864 P.2d at 1015.
12. Id. at 498, 864 P.2d at 1017.
13. Savage v. State, 127 Wash. 2d 434,899 P.2d 1270 (1995).
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could have reached the same result without disturbing the boundaries of
sovereign immunity in this state.
This Note begins with an introduction to the facts of Savage v. State.
Part I describes the framework of Washington's sovereign immunity
doctrine as it existed before the Savage decision. Part II examines how
Savage departs from previous Washington law, and how the case
confuses the law of sovereign immunity in this state. Part III addresses
the negative consequences of the Savage decision-not only for state,
county, and municipal governments, but for private corporations as well.
Finally, part IV argues that in order to clarify the scope of sovereign
immunity in Washington State, the Washington Supreme Court either
should abolish all judicially created limitations on state liability, or
devise a clear test to determine under what circumstances underlying
immunities will be extended to governmental employers. This test should
fit within the boundaries of sovereign immunity as they existed before
Savage. Only then will the law provide a clear picture of when and how
the state will be liable in tort.
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF WASHINGTON'S SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE BEFORE SAVAGE V STATE
The starting place for a discussion of sovereign immunity begins with
the English monarchy. The principle that the King was infallible dates
back almost 600 years and has traditionally protected the sovereign from
suit. 4 The theory of sovereign immunity was adopted initially in
American law based on the notion that the sovereign creates both the law
and the rights that the law protects.'5 This notion is embodied in the U.S.
Supreme Court's declaration that "there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."' 6 The
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit has now been either
partially or completely abolished in most states by statute. 7
Until 1961, Washington followed the common-law tradition of
sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity was written into the state
14. Diane M. Lowder, Comment, Obstacles to Holding a Parole Official in Virginia Liable for
the Negligent Release or Supervision of a Parolee, 22 U. Rich. L. Rev. 83, 84 (1987).
15. Id.
16. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349,353 (1907).
17. Scott J. Borth, Comment, Municipal Tort Liability for Erroneous Issuance of Building
Permits: A National Survey, 58 Wash. L. Rev. 537, 540 (1983). For a discussion of the abolition of
sovereign immunity in Washington, see Richard Cosway, Comment, Abolition of Sovereign
Immunity in Washington, 36 Wash. L. Rev. 312 (1961).
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constitution, creating legislative power to decide when and how the state
may be sued. 8 Pursuant to this power, in 1961 the State Legislature
enacted section 4.92.090 of the Revised Code of Washington, allowing
the State to be sued in tort to the sane extent as a person or corporation.' 9
This waiver of sovereign immunity has been construed broadly by the
Washington Supreme Court.2" However, by providing for several
limitations on state liability, the court has also made it clear that the
statute does not render the state liable for every harm that may flow from
governmental action.21
A. The Three Categories ofLimilations on State Tort Liability in
Washington
The supreme court has recognized three categories of limitations on
sovereign liability in Washington. The first is comprised of discretionary
acts, the second concerns the public duty doctrine, and the third includes
absolute and qualified immunities. When viewed in co:junction with
section 4.92.090, the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, these
limitations form the boundaries of sovereign immunity in Washington as
they existed before Savage v. State.
1. The First Limitation on State Tort Liability Applies to
Discretionary Acts
In 1965, the Washington Supreme Court created the discretionary acts
immunity22 and set out guidelines for its application.' Under this
exception to state tort liability, the State is immune from liability for its
discretionary acts but is not protected from liability for its operational or
18. Wash. Const. art. 1, § 26.
19. "The state of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be
liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person
or corporation." Wash. Rev. Code § 4.92.090 (1994); see also Wash. Rev. Code § 4.96.010 (1994)
(providing parallel statute waiving sovereign immunity for municipalities and state subdivisions).
20. Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 252, 407 P.2d 440, 443
(1965).
21. Id. at 253,407 P.2d at 444.
22. The cases discussing the discretionary acts doctrine indicate that the doctrine provides an
immunity from liability. They do not, however, suggest the lack of a duty on the part of the State.
See, e.g., infra note 29.
23. Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 254-55, 407 P.2d at 444-45; see also Bender v. City of Seattle,
99 Wash. 2d 582, 588, 664 P.2d 492,497 (1983).
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ministerial acts. 4 This means that legislative acts, administrative
rulemaking, and all judicial decisions should be immune from tort
liability because such activities involve high-level, policy-making
decisions.' On the other hand, lower-level decisions implementing that
policy are considered ministerial and therefore are not immune from tort
liability.26 The discretionary acts immunity is meant to ensure that courts
do not pass judgment on policy decisions made within the executive or
legislative branches of the government.2 In Evangelical United Brethren
Church v. State, the supreme court made clear that an act is considered
discretionary if it fits all of the following criteria:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily
involve a basic governmental policy, program, or objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the
realization or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective
as opposed to one which would not change the course or direction
of the policy, program, or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of
basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the
governmental agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make
the challenged act, omission, or decision?"8
Washington Supreme Court decisions indicate that the discretionary
acts limitation is extremely narrow.29 In fact, prior to the Savage
24. See Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 254,407 P.2d at 444-45.
25. Mark M. Myers, Comment, A Unified Approach to State and Municipal Tort Liability In
Washington, 59 Wash. L. Rev. 533, 536 (1984). An argument might have been made by the State in
Savage that the State would be immune from liability for its independent negligent acts under the
discretionary acts immunity. It is unclear whether such an argument would have succeeded.
26. Id.
27. Bender, 99 Wash. 2d at 588, 664 P.2d at 497.
28. Evangelical, 67 Wash. 2d at 255, 407 P.2d at 445.
29. See, e.g., Taggart v. State, 118 Wash. 2d 195, 215, 822 P.2d 243, 253 (1992) (deciding that
discretionary immunity exception does not shield parole officers from claims alleging negligent
supervision because parole officers' supervisory decisions, however much discretion they may
require, are not basic policy decisions); Emsley v. Army Nat'l Guard, 106 Wash. 2d 474, 479, 722
P.2d 1299, 1302 (1986) (holding that because discretionary acts exception is narrow, and firing of
artillery during National Guard training required no policy evaluation, act was ministerial and not
discretionary); Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421,434, 671 P.2d 230, 239-40 (1983) (finding that
discretionary function exception does not provide state immunity for crimes of mental patient
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decision, the supreme court expressly ruled that the discretionary acts
exception did not shield a parole cfficer from claims alleging negligent
supervision of a parolee." Considering this ruling, the discretionary acts
prong of sovereign immunity in Washington was inappropriately
weakened by the broad sweep of the Savage decision.
2. The Second Limitation Is the Public Duty Doctrine
A second limitation on Washington's broad waiver of sovereign
immunity is the public duty doctrine.3 It originated as a principle for
limiting the potentially widespread tort liability that followed the
abolition of governmental tort immunity.32 The public duty doctrine
protects a governmental entity from liability when the duty alleged to
have been violated is a duty owed to the public generally, rather than to a
private person.33 This doctrine is limited in that it contains several
exceptions where the state is not afforded protection becaase it is found
to have a duty toward the injured individual.
a. The Doctrine Does Not Protect the State Where There Is a Statute
Meant To Protect a Class of Individuals
The first exception to the public duty doctrine recognizes a duty when
there is a regulatory statute clearly indicating that it is intended to protect
a class of individuals and where the class includes the plaintiff.34 In
Halvorson v. Dahl,35 the Washington Supreme Court enunciated this
released from state hospital because psychiatrist's decision to release patient did not involve
balancing of policy considerations). But see Noonan v. State, 53 Wash. App. 55E, 562-63, 769 P.2d
313, 315-16 (1989) (holding that parole board is immune from liability for crimes of parolee while
on parole because board's decision to release prisoner involves basic governmental policy of
rehabilitating inmates).
30. Taggart, 118 Wash. 2d at 215, 822 P.2d at 253.
31. The public duty doctrine does not provide immunity from liability. Rather, it provides that
where the State owes a duty to the public as a whole, it owes no duty to an individual. See, e.g.,
Chambers-Castanes v. King County, I00 Wash. 2d 275,284, 669 P.2d 451,457 (1983).
32. Jenifer K. Marcus, Comment, Washington's Special Relationship Exception to the Public
Duty Doctrine, 64 Wash. L. Rev. 401 (1989). But see Goggin v. City of Seattle. 48 Wash. 2d 894,
297 P.2d 602 (1956) (suggesting that public duty doctrine may have been created before abolition of
sovereign immunity in Washington).
33. Chambers-Castanes, 100 Wash. 2d at 284, 669 P.2d at 457.
34. Honcoop v. State, 111 Wash. 2d 182, 188, '759 P.2d 1188, 1192 (1988).
35. 89 Wash. 2d 673, 676, 574 P.2d 1190, 1192 (1978) (noting that plaintiff -ontended that city
inspectors had knowledge of fire code violations in hotel prior to fire and did nothing to force
building owner to comply with code).
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duty and stated that when the Legislature clearly evinces an intent to
protect certain people, those people may bring an action in tort for a
violation of the statute or ordinance. It is only where the legislature
imposes a duty on public officials to the public as a whole that those
officials owe no duty to a particular individual.
3 6
b. The Doctrine Does Not Protect the State Where the State Does Not
Enforce a Specific Statute
The second exception to the public duty doctrine comes into play
when the government has failed to enforce a specific statute. A duty of
care is imposed where government agents who are responsible for
enforcing statutory requirements possess actual knowledge of a statutory
violation and fail to take corrective action despite a statutory duty to do
so." A further requirement is that the plaintiff be within the class the
statute is intended to protect.
38
c. The Doctrine Does Not Protect the State Where the State Has
Engaged in Volunteer Rescue Efforts
The third exception to the public duty doctrine is applicable when the
government has engaged in volunteer rescue efforts. This exception
follows from the common-law principle that one who undertakes to
render aid to another or to warn a person in danger must exercise
reasonable care.39 Based on Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., the state is
liable in tort if one of its employees gratuitously assumes a duty to aid or
rescue an individual and then breaches that duty. This is the result even if
the volunteer rescuer acted beyond the scope of his or her statutory
authority.40
36. Id
37. Bailey v. Forks, 108 Wash. 2d 262, 268-69, 737 P.2d 1257, 1260 (1987) (finding duty to
protect plaintiff under failure-to-enforce exception to public duty doctrine where police officer
allowed apparently drunk individual to drive his truck, and individual then struck motorcycle on
which plaintiff was riding).
38. Id. at 302, 545 P.2d at 19.
39. See, e.g., Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 293, 545 P.2d 13 (1975) (holding that
where State had information regarding avalanche danger and Department of Licensing employee
said he would notify landowners of danger, there was implied duty to warn those landowners within
statute creating that agency).
40. Id.
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d. The Doctrine Does Not Protect the State Where a Special
Relationship Exists Between the Plaintiff and the State Worker
The final exception to the public duty doctrine arises where a special
relationship exists between a government agent and a reasonably
foreseeable plaintiff. This exception to the public duty doctrine applies
only where the plaintiff relied on explicit assurances givea by the agent
or assurances inherent in a duty vested in a governmental entity.41 In
Chambers-Castanes v. King County,42 the court held that although the
duty of the police to protect the population usually falls within the
protection of the public duty doctrine, a special relationship giving rise to
reliance on the part of the victim was established between a plaintiff who
had called repeatedly for help and the police dispatcher who had
answered the calls. After the Chambers-Castanes case, it appears that an
actionable duty to an individual will arise on the part of a state or
municipal employee if assurances of action are given to the individual.
Strictly applied, the public duty doctrine could undermine completely
the waiver of sovereign inmunity found in section 4.92.090 of the
Revised Code of Washington.43 However, the four exceptions to the
public duty doctrine, most notably the special relationship rule, have
rendered it a weak tool in defending the state against tort actions." For
example, the public duty doctrine does not protect a parole officer from
liability for the acts of parolees. In Taggart v. State,45 the supreme court
stated that a duty on the part of a parole officer exists because the parole
officer has "taken charge" of the parolee under the special relationship
exception to the public duty doctrine. Having taken charge of the
parolee, the parole officer must exercise reasonable care to control the
parolee and to prevent him or her from committing crimes.46 The fact that
the public duty doctrine does not protect a parole officer from negligent
41. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
42. 100 Wash. 2d 275,286-87,669 P.2d 451, .58-59 (1983).
43. Myers, supra note 25, at 537.
44. Id. at 540.
45. 118 Wash. 2d 195, 219-20, 822 P.2d 243, 255 (1992) (victims of crimes by parolees alleged
negligent parole supervision and sought damages from State for injuries).
46. Id at 224, 822 P.2d at 257. The court stated that:
The duty we announce here arises only once it has been shown that the defendant parole officer
lacks both absolute and qualified immunity. To pierce these immunities, the plaintiffmust show,
first, that the officer's actions were not an integral part of any judicial or quasi.judicial process,
and, second, that the officer failed to perform a statutory duty according to procedures dictated
by statute and superiors. Only then does the question of duty arise.
Id.
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supervision suits suggests that Savage should not have affected this
prong of Washington's sovereign immunity framework.
3. The Third Category ofLimitations on the State's Waiver of
Sovereign Immunity Includes Absolute and Qualified Immunity
The final, and most important limitation on state tort liability for the
purposes of analyzing the scope of sovereign immunity after Savage v.
State, exists in the immunities applied by the Washington Supreme
Court. There are two types of immunities: absolute and qualified. The
type of immunity that is applied in a given situation depends on the
nature of the official's public duties.47 It is the failure to extend an
underlying personal qualified immunity from a state employee to the
State that is the crux of the Savage decision.48
a. Absolute Immunity
Absolute immunities extend to most tortious acts, regardless of
whether they are done with malicious intent." Judicial and quasi-judicial
immunities fall within the category of absolute immunities. One example
of absolute immunity was recognized in Creelman v. Svenningj where
the supreme court held that prosecutors enjoy a quasi-judicial immunity
for acts performed in their official capacity. The quasi-judicial immunity
enunciated in Creelman was absolute because it applied whether or not
the prosecutor acted maliciously.5'
Creelman was also the first case in Washington to extend the
immunity of a government employee to the government employer.52 The
supreme court limited the Restatement (Second) of Torts rule that the
immunity of one does not bar recovery against others, to situations where
47. John J. Grant, Note, Torts-Governmental Immunity-Absolute Versus Qualified Immunityfor
Public OfficialsActing In Quasi-Judicial Capacities, 24 Wayne L. Rev. 1513, 1514 (1978).
48. For the purposes of this Note, an "underlying immunity" is that given to the state employee.
The immunity is "extended" when it protects the government employer from respondeat superior
liability.
49. Grant, supra note 47.
50. 67 Wash. 2d 882, 884, 410 P.2d 606, 607-08 (1966) (holding that public policy required
absolute immunity for prosecuting attorney, regardless of whether he acted with malice and without
probable cause, in order to insure active and independent action of officers charged with prosecution
of crime).
51. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Manley, 181 Wash. 327, 331, 43 P.2d 39, 40 (1935)).
52. Id. at 883,410 P.2d at 606.
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policy reasons supported immunity for one and not the others.5 3 This is
the basis for the policy-driven analysis required by the court in later
cases involving the extension of immunities.5 4 The court reasoned that
the public policy supporting quasi-judicial immunity for the prosecutor
also required immunity for both the State and county; otherwise, the
objective sought by giving immunity to the prosecutor would be
frustrated."
Another example of the extension of an underlying immunity to the
governmental employer can be found in Lutheran Day Care v.
Snohomish County.56 That decision, while extending the quasi-judicial
immunity of a County Hearing Examiner to the county for intentional
interference with a business expectancy, clarified the policy analysis
required by Creelman in deciding whether to extend an underlying
immunity to the government employer.57 The Lutheran Day Care court
stated that a strict reliance on precedent, without a corresponding policy
analysis, would not be enough to justify the extension of an immunity."
The Lutheran Day Care policy analysis requires the following: (1) an
inquiry into the legislative intent behind a statute creating or affecting an
immunity; (2) a finding that the policy that supports the creation of the
underlying immunity also supports the extension of that immunity to the
employer; and (3) an assurance that extending an underlying immunity
will not leave the plaintiff without a remedy.59 The Lutheran Day Care
court found that the policy concerns supporting an underlying immunity
were not strong enough to support the extension of that immunity to the
agency under the relevant statute.') But public policy did support the
extension of a county officer's quasi-judicial immunity to the county for
intentional interference with a business expectancy.6'
53. Id. at 885,410 P.2d at 608.
54. Infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
55. Creelman, 67 Wash. 2d at 885, 410 P.2d at 608; see also Anderson v. Manley, 181 Wash.
327, 331, 43 P.2d 39, 40 (1935) (stating that public policy is not for protection of officers, but for
protection of public, in order to insure active and independent action of off cers charged with
prosecution of crime).
56. 119 Wash. 2d 91, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), cen. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993).
57. Id. at 127, 829 P.2d at 764.
58. Id. at 100, 829 P.2d at 750.
59. Id. at 103-07, 829 P.2d at 751-53.
60. Id. at 111, 829 P.2d at 755-56.
61. Id. at 127, 829 P.2d at 764.
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b. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunities apply only if the government employee has
fulfilled certain requirements, including a requirement of acting in good
faith.6" An example of a qualified immunity is found in Guffey v. State.63
In Guffey, a state police officer was held to have a qualified immunity in
an action for false imprisonment and arrest where the arrest was made
pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.' To receive qualified immunity,
it was required that the officer act reasonably in carrying out a statutory
duty according to the procedures dictated to him by statute and his
61superiors.
Courts have extended qualified immunities from government
employees to the government employer on several occasions.66 In the
Guffey case, a state trooper had stopped Guffey for a statutorily
authorized "spot inspection" of his driver's license, registration, and
equipment. When Guffey was stopped, the trooper ran a radio check on
his expired driver's license and was advised that there was a felony
warrant out for a man fitting Guffey's description and with a similar
name. As a result Guffey was detained erroneously. In dismissing the
suit against the state trooper and the State, the court stated that there can
be no liability as a master unless the servant is liable.67 The trooper was
entitled to qualified immunity for false arrest and imprisonment as long
as he was acting reasonably in furtherance of a statutory duty and
according to the procedures dictated to him by statute and superiors.6 As
a result, the court found that the State could not be held liable on a
respondeat superior theory of liability.69
62. Grant, supra note 47.
63. 103 Wash. 2d 144, 690 P.2d 1163 (1984).
64. Id. at 152, 690 P.2d at 1167.
65. Id
66. See Frost v. City of Walla Walla, 106 Wash. 2d 669, 724 P.2d 1017 (1986) (extending
statutory qualified immunity of police officer to city for seizure and improper impoundment of
vehicle); Guffey, 103 Wash. 2d at 153, 690 P.2d at 1168. Guffey relied on Nyman v. MacRae
Brothers Construction, 69 Wash. 2d 285, 418 P.2d 253 (1966). In that case, the court stated that a
master cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory of liability unless a servant is first found
liable. The court also stated that a finding of respondeat superior liability required a determination
that the servant was negligent and that his negligent act was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs
injuries. Id.
67. Guffey, 103 Wash. 2dat 153, 690 P.2d at 1168.
68. Id. at 152,690 P.2d at 1167.
69. Id. at 152-53, 690 P.2d at 1167-68.
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Another example of a qualified immunity's extension from an
employee to the government employer is Frost v. City of Walla Walla.7"
In that case, the supreme court held that a statutory immutity precluding
liability for police officers engaged in the lawful performance of their
duties extended to the city.7 1 The statute in question was section
69.50.506(c) of the Revised Code of Washington, which provided that no
liability would be imposed under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act
upon "any authorized state, county or municipal officer, engaged in the
lawful performance of his duties."'72 The court read this statutory
language as providing a shield for the City of Walla Walla. from liability
under the doctrine of respondeat sup-erior.73 The court reasoned that:
It is readily apparent that the purpose behind RCW 69.50.506(c)
was to promote efficient and unhampered police action, free from
the hindrance created if liability could be imposed or. police for
their good faith, objectively reasonable actions. To give the officers
protection against liability, while allowing suits against the
jurisdiction employing them, would defeat this purpose. 4
Although not expressly stated by the court, the statutory immunity
provided in Frost was clearly a qualified immunity, as it applied only if
the officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his duties. If the
statute had granted an officer immunity regardless of whether his actions
were reasonable, lawful, or in good faith, it would have been an absolute
immunity.
c. Absolute and Qualified Immunity as Applied to Actions of a Parole
Officer
The Washington Supreme Court has applied both absolute and
qualified immunities to the actions of parole officers while they are
engaged in different duties. In Taggart v. State,75 the supreme court
recognized that a parole officer is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial
immunity only for actions that are an integral part of a judicial or quasi-
70. 106 Wash. 2d 669, 724 P.2d 1017.
71. Id. at 673, 724 P.2d at 1020.
72. Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.506(c) (1994).
73. Frost, 106 Wash. 2d at 673-74, 724 P.2d at 1020.
74. Id. at 673, 724 P.2d at 1020.
75. 118 Wash. 2d 195, 822 P.2d 243 (1992) (allowing parole officers immunity for allegedly
negligent parole release and supervision decisions where parolees assaulted and raped their victims).
1080
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judicial proceeding.76 Examples of such actions include enforcing the
conditions of parole and providing the parole board with reports to assist
in determining whether to grant parole."
The Taggart court also recognized that parole officers may be entitled
to personal qualified immunity for those acts that fall outside judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings as long as they act in furtherance of a
statutory duty and in substantial compliance with the directives of
superiors and relevant regulatory guidelines.78 The court reasoned that
completely stripping parole officers of immunity would make them more
concerned with avoiding lawsuits than with doing their jobs.79 At the
same time, the court sought to ensure that parolees would receive
adequate supervision by requiring that parole officers act within and in
furtherance of statutes, guidelines, and the directives of superiors.8"
More importantly, Taggart made clear that a trial court should not
address the question of whether a parole officer acted negligently until
after it had determined that the parole officer was ineligible for
immunity." The court stated specifically that: "The duty we announce
here arises only once it has been shown that the defendant parole officer
lacks both absolute and qualified immunity." 2 In order to pierce these
immunities, the plaintiff must show both that the officer's actions were
not an integral part of any judicial or quasi-judicial process, and that the
officer failed to perform a statutory duty according to procedures dictated
by statute and superiors.
d. Babcock v. State Is the Only Washington Case Refusing To Extend
an Underlying Immunity to the State
Prior to Savage, the only case where the supreme court refused to
extend an underlying immunity to the State was Babcock v. State.4 In
that case, the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) was not
sued on a respondeat superior theory of liability, but rather, was sued
76. Id. at 213, 822 P.2d at 252.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 216, 822 P.2d at 253.
79. Id. at 215, 822 P.2d at 253.
80. Id. at 215-16, 822 P.2d at 253.
81. Id. at 224, 822 P.2d at 257.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. 116 Wash. 2d 596, 809 P.2d 143 (1991).
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solely for its own independent negligent acts in placing children with a
foster parent who subsequently raped them. 5 The supreme court declined
to extend a statutory immunity granted to caseworkers for emergency
child placement decisions to DSHS. The court reasoned that the wording
of section 26.44.060 of the Revised Code of Washington, the statute
granting the immunity, expressly admonished the court not to construe
the immunity as granting sovereign immunity. s6 The statute states that
"[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed as to supersede or abridge
remedies provided in chapter 4.92 RCW.' ' s7 In addition, the court
recognized the policy considerations cited in Creelman as controlling the
question of whether a government agency can take advantage of its
agent's immunity defense."8 The rule of Babcock, when viewed in light
of other immunities cases, can thus be stated as follows: where the State
is sued directly for its own independent negligent acts, the underlying
immunity of the State's workers will not shield the State from liability.
II. THE SAVAGE CASE NEEDLESSLY CONFUSES THE
FRAMEWORK OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN
WASHINGTON STATE
The Washington Supreme Court ruled in Savage v. State that the
policy reasons supporting the application of an underlying personal
qualified immunity to a parole officer did not support the extension of
that immunity to the State.89 That holding resulted in state respondeat
superior liability for negligent supervision of a parolee on the part of
parole officers. The Savage court could have reached the same result by
following the framework of sovereign immunity as it has evolved in
Washington through the Creelman, Guffey, Frost, Lutheran Day Care,
and Babcock decisions. This result could have been reached by correctly
applying the policy-oriented analysis required by Creelman and
Lutheran Day Care to the question of whether or not to extend the parole
officers' immunity to the State. If, in applying this analysis, the court
found that the parole officers' underlying immunity should not be
extended to the State, the plaintiff could have recovered either under the
respondeat superior theory of liability or the direct theory of liability. If
85. Id. at 621, 809 P.2d at 156.
86. Id. at 620, 809 P.2d at 156.
87. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.44.060(3) (1994) (referring to Wash. Rev. Code § 4.92.090 waiving
sovereign immunity in Washington); see supra note 19.
88. Babcock, 116 Wash. 2d at 621, 809 P.2d at 156.
89. Savage v. State, 127 Wash. 2d 434,446, 899 P.2d 1270, 1276 (1995).
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the analysis required the extension of the parole officers' immunity to the
State, the court's holding in Babcock still would have allowed a finding
of liability for the State's own independent negligent acts. The strict
application of previously existing precedent would have allowed the
extension of an underlying personal qualified immunity under some
circumstances while maintaining the boundaries of sovereign immunity.
The Savage case convolutes the law of sovereign immunity in
Washington and casts doubt on the precedential value of numerous
landmark cases. Under Savage, determining what underlying qualified
immunities, if any, will extend to government employers sued on a
respondeat superior theory of liability is difficult. As a result, it is unclear
under what circumstances a government employer will be held liable on
a respondeat superior theory of liability for the negligent acts of its
employees.
A. The Savage Court Incorrectly Relied on Babcock
The court relied on Babcock to support its decision not to extend the
personal qualified immunity of an agent to the State. However, Babcock
is inapposite to Savage for two reasons. First, the court cites Babcock for
a proposition different from that for which it stands. Second, Babcock is
distinguishable from Savage. Through its unique interpretation of
Babcock, the Savage court has effectively overruled the Guffey and Frost
decisions, and possibly the Creelman decision as well.
1. Babcock Stands for a Different Proposition Than That for Which It
Was Cited
The Savage court chose to cite Babcock for the proposition that an
agent's immunity does not establish a defense for the principal.9" The
Babcock court did make that assertion,9 but it was dicta as regards a
respondeat superior case, because Babcock only concerned direct
liability. Babcock specifically rejected the use of respondeat superior
liability and instead evaluated plaintiffs' claims on the basis of the
agency's independent negligent acts. The court stated: "In the case at
bench, however, the Babcocks have alleged that DSHS's negligent
supervision caused injury. Personal immunities granted employees
90. Savage, 127 Wash. 2d at 438, 899 P.2d at 1273 (quoting Babcock, 116 Wash. 2d at 620, 809
P.2d at 156).
91. Babcock, 116 Wash. 2d at 621, 809 P.2d at 156.
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cannot reach the separate actions of their employer because a judgment
in favor of one tortfeasor does not terminate claims against a separate
tortfeasor."'92 Hence, the court stated only that personal immunities
cannot be extended to the separate actions of the employer. The opinion
said nothing about imputing an employee's negligent acts to the
employer on a vicarious liability theory.
Unless Babcock is viewed as standing for the proposition that
underlying immunities will not be extended to the employer for the
employer's independent negligent acts, it does not make sense. If the
case is interpreted to mean that an agent's immunity will never establish
a defense for the principal, then the Babcock decision overrules both
Creelman and Guffey. If the Babcock court had meant to overrule
Creelman and Guffey, it would not have taken pains to distinguish the
facts of those cases from its own in the following statement: "But in both
Creelman and Guffey the State had committed no acts of its own; the
plaintiffs could only sue on the basis of respondeat superior.""
Therefore, Babcock does not foreclose the extension of ;my underlying
immunity to the government employer. By holding that a social worker's
statutory immunity may not be extended to DSHS, the court only
addressed the separate negligent acts of that agency.
2. Babcock Is. Distinguishable from Savage
Another reason why the Savage court should not have relied on
Babcock is that Babcock was based on a statute which was not applicable
in Savage. The statute in question is section 26.44.060(3) of the Revised
Code of Washington.94 This statute provides a qualified immunity to
DSHS caseworkers for the emergency removal of children from abusive
situations. However, "the Legislature made it clear in RCW 26.44.060(3)
that it did not intend to supersede or abridge remedies in RCW 4.92."'
The court therefore did not extend the common-law immunity it adopted
92. Id. (emphasis added) (distinguishing Creelman and Guffey on ground&. that they involved
respondeat superior liability); see also Babcock v. State, 112 Wash. 2d 83, 103-14, 768 P.2d 481,
494-97 (1989) (Utter, J., dissenting), reconsidered at 116 Wash. 2d 596, 809 P.2d 143 (1991).
93. Babcock, 116 Wash. 2d at 621, 809 P.2d at 156.
94. Wash. Rev. Code. § 26.44.060(3) (1994).
95. Savage v. State, 127 Wash. 2d 434, 458, 899 P.2d 1270, 1282 (1995) (Madsen J., dissenting).
Referring to Washington's statute waiving sovereign immunity, Wash. Rev. Code § 22.44.060(3)
states: "Conduct conforming with the reporting requirements of this chapter shall not be deemed a
violation of the confidential communication privilege of RCW 5.60.060(3) and (4), 18.53.200 and
18.83.110. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as to supersede or abridge remedies provided
in chapter 4.92 RCW." Id. (emphasis added); see also Wash. Rev. Code § 4.92.0)0 (1994).
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for caseworkers to the State. There is no such statute applicable in the
Savage case. In light of the absence of statutory requirements in Savage,
Babcock is not controlling on the issue of whether or not to extend a
parole officer's personal qualified immunity to the State for the alleged
negligent supervision of a parolee.
B. The Savage Court's Reasoning Is Based on Restatement Language
That Had Been Explicitly Rejected in Washington
Savage has further confused the boundaries of sovereign immunity in
this state by applying the restatement rule over established Washington
precedent. The Restatements are not mandatory authority. They are a
general restatement of the common-law of the fifty states. As noted by
the dissent in Savage, they are not a restatement of the law of each
individual state,96 nor are they a restatement of the law of Washington
prior to the Savage decision.97 They were intended to promote
uniformity, but not to erase individual state treatment of particular
issues.9"
The rule reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Agency is that an
agent's immunity from civil liability generally does not establish a
defense for the principal.99 Prior to Savage, this rule had been rejected in
Washington. This is reflected in the fact that previous Washington cases
extending an underlying immunity to the State were decided in the face
of arguments based on the Restatement (Second) of Agency section 2171"'
and the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 88020' As stated in the
Savage dissent:
96. See Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 647 P.2d 713 (Haw. 1982) (stating that under theory of
vicarious liability where parole officer has immunity from suit, employer would also be immune);
see also Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1992) (holding that with respect to high-speed
police pursuits, police officer's official immunity extends to his or her employer).
97. See Savage, 127 Wash. 2d at 451, 899 P.2d at 1279 (Madsen J., dissenting); see also Babcock,
116 Wash. 2d at 620-21, 809 P.2d at 156 (recognizing that some personal immunities of goverment
officials have been extended to government in this state in spite of fact that Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 217 states contrary rule).
98. See, e.g., Herbert F. Goodrich, Introduction to Restatement (Second) of Agency at vii-viii
(1958); William D. Lewis, Introduction to Restatement of Torts at viii-ix (1934); Herbert Wechsler,
Introduction to Restatement (Second) of Torts at ix (1964).
99. Restatement (Second) ofAgency § 217.
100. Frost v. City ofWalla Walla, 106 Wash. 2d 669, 674,724 P.2d 1017, 1020 (1986). The Frost
court expressly overruled Spencer v. King County, 39 Wash. App. 201, 692 P.2d 874 (1984) (relying
on Restatement (Second) of Agency section 217 when refusing to extend underlying immunity to
municipal employer).
101. Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wash. 2d 882, 885, 410 P.2d 606,608 (1966).
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The agency principle upon which the majority relies did not require
a different result [in Creelman] .... This conclusion was reached in
precisely the kind of case now before the court-where a party is
asserting that a general rule be applied to hold that immunity of a
state agent does not extend to the State where the State is sued on
the basis of respondeat superior. 2
In addition, the dissent points out that the Frost decision disapproved
an earlier case relying on the Restatement (Second) of Agency section
217.03 As discussed earlier, in Frost v. Walla Walla'" the supreme court
extended the immunity of a police officer, acting lawfully in furtherance
of the Controlled Substances Act, to the State. In so holding, the court
disapproved the decision in Spencer v. King County"5 that relied on the
Restatement (Second) of Agency section 217 in refusing to extend
individual policy officer immunity to the county under Ihe involuntary
commitment law. 6 Disapproving Spencer was necessary, the court
stated, because the decision there contradicted Creelman v. Svenning.'0 7
The Creelman court rejected an argument similar to that embodied in
the Restatement (Second) of Agency section 217. The Creelman court
faced the general rule reflected in section 880 of the Restatement of
Torts: the immunity of one of two or more persons, who would
otherwise be liable for a harm, does not bar recovery against the
others.1 8 The Creelman court rejected the wording of the rule and
modified it."° The court stated that the general rule would apply only in
situations where the policy reasons supporting immunity for one party
would not support immunity for the other party."0 The court went on to
say that the policy reasons supporting absolute immunity for a prosecutor
charged with malicious prosecution also support the extension of that
immunity to the prosecutor's employer."
102. Savage, 127 Wash. 2d at 451-52, 899 P.2d at 1279 (Madsen J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 452, 899 P.2d at 1279 (referring to Spencer, 39 Wash. App. 201, 692 P.2d 874,
overruled by Frost, 106 Wash. 2d 669, 724 P.2d 1017).
104. 106 Wash. 2d 669, 724 P.2d 1017.
105. 39 Wash. App. 201,692 P.2d 874.
106. Id,
107. 106 Wash. 2d at 673-74,724 P.2d at 1019-20.
108. Restatement of Torts § 880 (1939).
109. Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wash. 2d 882, 885,410 P.2d 606, 608 (1966).
110. Id.
111. Id
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Neither the Restatement (Second) of Agency section 217, nor
Restatement of Torts section 880 represent the general rule in this state.
This is reflected in the cases that have been decided in the face of those
arguments." 2 Therefore, the Savage court's use of section 217 to support
its holding is misplaced in light of Washington case authority specifically
contravening that general rule. If the Savage decision is read as adopting
the restatement rule, then cases such as Creelman and Frost have been
effectively overruled. This result may leave government employers open
to liability on a respondeat superior basis for the negligent acts of both
prosecutors and police officers.
C. The Savage Court's Policy Analysis Is Not Persuasive
Perhaps the most confusing aspect of Savage is its application of the
policy analysis originally required by Creelman v. Svenning"3 and later
elaborated in Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County."' The policy
analysis is key to a court's determination of whether or not to extend an
underlying immunity to the government employer. Unfortunately, the
Savage court's analysis is not persuasive because it fails to examine
thoroughly all of the pertinent policy questions.
1. Refusing To Extend a Parole Officer's Underlying Immunity to the
State Does Not Necessarily Result in the State Using a Higher Level
of Care To Draft Parole Guidelines
The Savage court reasoned that the rationale underlying the grant of
personal qualified immunity to parole officers did not support the
extension of that immunity to the State."5 The court recognized that
parole officers supervising parolees are called upon to make difficult
112. Id. at 882, 410 P.2d at 606; Frost v. City of Walla Walla, 106 Wash. 2d 669, 724 P.2d 1017
(1986).
113. 67 Wash. 2d 882, 885, 410 P.2d 606, 608 (1966) (allowing extension of prosecutor's
underlying immunity to government employer where public policy requiring immunity for
prosecutor also required immunity for government).
114. 119 Wash. 2d 91, 106, 829 P.2d 746, 753 (1992) (holding that, when extending absolute
quasi-judicial immunity of hearing examiner and county council to county on respondeat superior
theory for intentional interference with business expectancy, three elements to analysis include (1)
inquiry into legislative intent behind statute creating or affecting immunity, (2) showing how policy
reasons justify underlying immunity also justify extension of immunity, and (3) showing that
plaintiff will not be left without remedy), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993).
115. Savage v. State, 127 Wash. 2d 434,446, 899 P.2d 1270, 1276 (1995).
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decisions that may be affected by the prospect of personal liability.', 6
However, the court stated that the same could not be said about state
liability. On the contrary, the cou:rt argued that state liability could be
expected to encourage the State to use reasonable care in fashioning
guidelines and procedures for the supervision of parolees." 7
Certainly, encouraging the State to use reasonable care in constructing
its procedures for supervision of parolees is an important public policy.
However, that policy is advanced only by holding the State liable for its
own independent negligent acts in constructing those procedures, in
training its parole officers, and in establishing parole guidelines. Holding
the State liable on a respondeat superior theory of liability for the
negligent acts of its parole officers in supervising the: parolee does
nothing to forward that public policy. As suggested by the Savage
dissent, without an extension of the parole officer's underlying
immunity, the State will be liable on a respondeat superior theory for a
parole officer's negligent acts regardless of whether the officer
substantially complied with directives and regulations.' Because the
State would thus be held liable for a parole officer's negligent acts
regardless of whether or not the parole officer ha6 fulfilled the
requirements associated with personal qualified immunity, it would make
little difference that the State drafted the guidelines %ith reasonable
care."
9
Holding the State liable on a respondeat superior theory of liability for
the negligent acts of parole officers in supervising paiolees will not
promote greater diligence on the part of the State in drafting
requirements for parole officers. However, holding the State directly
liable for its own negligent drafting will result in a greater level of
diligence. Furthermore, allowing fe State to share the parole officer's
underlying immunity would advance the policy of protecting parole
officers from undue scrutiny and fear of liability. In light of these
advantages, the majority's public policy argument is unpersuasive.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 456, 899 P.2d at 1281 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
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2. Both Absolute Quasi-Judicial Immunity and Personal Qualified
Immunity Are Ultimately Designed To Protect the Public
Another policy argument made by the Savage majority was that
Creelman v. Svenning120 did not control because Creelman dealt with
absolute quasi-judicial immunity while Savage involved a personal
qualified immunity." Savage asserted that quasi-judicial immunity and
personal qualified immunity are designed to serve different functions.
122
The court reasoned that quasi-judicial immunity was meant to protect
persons whose functions are so comparable to a judge as to require the
same protection as a judge. By contrast, the court asserted that personal
qualified immunity was meant to protect the individual from the
inhibiting effect that fear of personal liability would have on job
performance."
The distinction drawn by the court is not persuasive. As pointed out in
the Savage dissent, neither Washington case law nor common sense
support such a distinction." In Creelman, the ultimate purpose of the
absolute quasi-judicial immunity was the welfare of the public.' 25 That
goal was accomplished by allowing a prosecutor to do his or her job
without fear of precipitating tort litigation. By eliminating the fear of tort
liability, prosecutors are free to prosecute unpopular cases and to proceed
against those who might otherwise strike back at the prosecutor through
the legal system.
The welfare of the public is also the ultimate purpose of the personal
qualified immunity granted to parole officers. In Taggart v. State, the
court made it clear that the purpose of granting qualified immunity to
parole officers is to enable them to perform a difficult job under exacting
conditions where decisions must be made after balancing the parolee's
liberty and the safety of the public.' 26 To perform that job effectively,
parole officers must be free of the fear of lawsuits.'27
Given that the supreme court has on other occasions articulated the
proposition that the personal qualified immunity is meant to advance
120. 67 Wash. 2d 882,410 P.2d 606 (1966).
121. Savage, 127 Wash. 2d at 441, 899 P.2d at 1273-74.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 441-42, 899 P.2d at 1274.
124. Id. at 454, 899 P.2d at 1280 (Madsen J., dissenting).
125. Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wash. 2d 882, 884,410 P.2d 606, 607 (1966).
126. Taggart v. State, 118 Wash. 2d 195, 215, 822 P.2d 243, 253 (1992).
127. Id.
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public welfare by protecting a parole officer from fear of litigation,'28 the
majority's attempt to distinguish absolute and qualified :immunities on
the basis of their underlying purposes is unpersuasive.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SAVAGE DECISION
Savage may have several consequences. First, if the case is read to
reject the extension of a personal qualified immunity under all
circumstances, Savage will have effectively overruled both Frost v.
Walla Walla and Guffey v. State. Second, it may affect other personal
qualified immunities such as that provided in the good Samaritan statute.
Finally, the court's interpretation of section 4.92.090 of the Revised
Code of Washington may render the discretionary acts immunity and the
public duty doctrine void.
A. Savage Effectively Overrules the Frost and Guffey Decisions
If Savage is read broadly, as a refusal to extend any personal qualified
immunity to the government where it has been sued on a respondeat
superior theory of liability, the decision appears to overrule both Guffey
v. State129 and Frost v. City of Walla Walla.'30 Those two cases extended
the underlying immunities of police officers to thei government
employers. As the Savage dissent points out, by rejecting the extension
of a qualified immunity to the State, the court has left state and local
governmental employers open to suit for the actions of their police
officers.'' This could have far reaching effects on public safety. For
example, a police department that is trying to avoid respondeat superior
liability for the negligent acts of its officers is likely to avoid sending
officers to situations where such liability may result. This is exactly the
sort of result that the Frost court was trying to avoid when it allowed the
extension of a police officer's underlying immunity to the government
employer. 32
128. Id.
129. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
131. Savage v. State, 127 Wash. 2d 434, 459, 899 P.2d 1270, 1282 (1995) (Madsen, J.,
dissenting).
132. Frost v. City of Walla Walla, 106 Wash. 2d 669, 673, 724 P.2d 1017, 1020 (1986) (stating
that purpose of statute creating immunity was to promote efficient and unhamp.-red police action,
and refusing to extend immunity would defeat that purpose).
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B. If Savage Precludes the Extension of a Personal Qualified
Immunity, Extension of this Rule to Other Qualified Immunities
May Defeat Their Purposes
A broad reading of Savage also opens up the possibility of
undermining other immunities. For instance, Washington's good
Samaritan statute. protects people who render medical aid or provide
transportation in an emergency. The immunity provided is qualified
because it applies only as long as the good Samaritan is a volunteer
acting without gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct. If the
Savage decision precludes the extension of all underlying qualified
immunities to a government employer, this could have far reaching
results.
Given the possibility of respondeat superior liability for voluntary
emergency aid rendered by state employees, it would make sense for a
government employer to discourage such action. It is certainly
conceivable that in a situation such as the 1995 bombing of the federal
building in Oklahoma City, state employees could be deterred from
rendering voluntary emergency aid by the fear that their actions might
render their employer liable. If, on the other hand, the Savage decision
precludes the extension of underlying qualified immunities to any
employer, fear of tort liability could drive corporate entities to actively
discourage their employees from rendering aid in emergencies. Such an
outcome would defeat the purpose of the good Samaritan statute by
discouraging people from helping each other in emergencies.
C. The Savage Court's Interpretation of Section 4.92.090 of the
Revised Code of Washington Contradicts the Use of the
Discretionary Acts Immunity and the Public Duty Doctrine
The third consequence of Savage is that it contradicts the supreme
court's own prior use of the discretionary acts immunity and the public
duty doctrine. The Savage court stated that section 4.92.09034 operates
to make the State presumptively liable in all instances in which the
legislature has not indicated otherwise.3 This broad statement is
contradicted by the court's use of the discretionary acts exception and the
133. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.300 (1994) (providing personal qualified immunity to volunteer
providers of emergency medical care or transportation).
134. Supra note 19.
135. Savage, 127 Wash. 2d at 445, 899 P.2d at 1276.
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public duty doctrine to protect the State from tort liability, both of which
evolved judicially as a response to the legislative waiver of sovereignimmunity in 196136 The Legislature did not create these Limits on state
liability, nor has it ever codified them. Rather, they were created by the
supreme court.
If the Savage court's interpretation of section 4.92.090 is read
literally, all of the judicially created limitations on state liability must fall
along with the extension of a parole officer's personal qualified
immunity. This certainly could not be the court's intended result. If the
Savage court had meant to destroy all three wings of sovereign immunity
in Washington, it would surely have said so expressly. Therefore, the
court erred in arguing that the State must be presumptively liable in all
circumstances where the legislature has not otherwise allowed for
immunity.
IV. THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT SHOULD CLARIFY
THE BOUNDARIES OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN
WASHINGTON STATE
Given the confused state of sovereign immunity doctrine in
Washington after Savage, the supreme court should clarify its
boundaries. Are the discretionary acts immunity and the public duty
doctrine still viable after Savage? It is likely that the court did not intend
to draw those doctrines into question with its interpretation of section
4.92.090. Is it the rule of Savage, broadly, that no personal qualified
immunity will be extended to the government employer? Or should it be
read more narrowly so that the personal qualified immunity of a parole
officer will not be extended to the government employer? From the
majority opinion it is difficult to tell. After the Savage court worked so
hard to destroy any argument for the extension of an underlying personal
qualified immunity, it is likely that the broad statement is a more
appropriate interpretation of the holding. These questions would not have
arisen if the court had allowed the extension of the parole officers'
immunity on the vicarious liability claims and refused it on the direct
negligence claims.
If the court wishes to abolish all limits on state liability, it should
explicitly say so. If not, the supreme court should devise a clear test that
makes policy sense, staying within the parameters of Washington case
law as it existed before the Savage decision, and determining under what
136. Supra notes 23, 32.
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circumstances underlying immunities will be extended to governmental
employers sued on a respondeat superior theory of liability.
V. CONCLUSION
The Washington Supreme Court, in its enthusiasm to reach a
particular result in Savage v. State, needlessly muddied the boundaries of
sovereign immunity in Washington. Employers must be able to predict
with some accuracy when they will be protected by their employee's
underlying immunities and when they will be left open to respondeat
superior liability. Citizens should have a clearer picture of what torts will
constitute liability for the State. This result can be achieved either by
abolishing all judicially created limitations on State liability or by
following Washington case law as it existed before the Savage decision.

